The diplomatic, military, and economic relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC), the United States, and Taiwan Republic of China (ROC) are at a critical point in history, when it is necessary to avoid armed conflict at all costs. Both the United States and the PRC, along with Taiwan, realize the magnitude of direct confrontation in terms of destruction, of life, property, and bilateral exchanges. The United States and the PRC, soon to be the two dominant powers of the world, although at the cusp of large-scale, economic interdependence, often have differing opinions on issues that are increasingly playing a larger role in each nation's foreign policy. Included in these issues are human rights, religious tolerance, and the role that Taiwan will play on the global stage. This final issue, the Taiwan question, is probably the most likely issue to cause conflict between the United States and the PRC, if conflict is going to occur at all. The rhetoric surrounding this issue has been strong on all sides, including that rhetoric coming from Taiwan. But, simply analyzing the conflicting words of the nations cannot describe the magnitude that this issue holds for stability in the region.
To truly understand the issue, one must look at the historical perspective of the possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait, specifically looking at the events of 1996 surrounding the PRC's decision to launch test missiles just off the coast of Taiwan during Taiwan's historic direct, democratic election. These events are, most likely, what brought the increased importance of economic interdependence between the United States and the PRC in the last few years to the helm of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, the United States has actively pursued the ascension of the PRC, and Taiwan, into the World Trade Organization (WTO), bringing the government and people of the PRC into the global economy. It is a belief throughout the United States, and much of the developed world, that through economic dependence, the PRC government will be less inclined to start a conflict over Taiwan, with increased levels of possible loss, in terms of economics, from an armed conflict.
When Taiwan scheduled its historic, direct presidential election for March 23, 1996, the Xinhua News Agency of the PRC announced that the PRC would conduct missile launch tests approximately 35 nautical miles off the northern coast and 52 nautical miles off the southwestern coast of Taiwan from March 8 until just after the election. Beijing emphasized that these tests were merely military exercises, with no chance of hitting Taiwan. Such missile tests, however, increased speculation as to Beijing's intentions and the impact of its missile tests on the security of the region. The U.S. government, through its offices in the White House and on Capitol Hill, issued statements advising both sides across the Taiwan Strait to exercise an increased level of self-restraint during this time. Numerous declarations and bills were passed by the United States Congress. At one point during the U.S. Senate dialogue, an official proposal read, "...It is the sense of the Congress...to deplore the missile tests and military exercises that the People's Republic of China is conducting from March 8 through March 25, 1996, and view such tests and exercises as potentially serious threats to the peace, security, and stability of Taiwan and not in the spirit of the three United States-China Joint Communiqués."1 The United States also immediately sent the aircraft carrier, USS Independence, and its accompanying naval combatants, to the Asia-Pacific region.
This was the first time since the Taiwan Strait tension of 1958 that the United States determined that American security interests in the Taiwan Strait were being threatened. For the next several weeks, the world witnessed intensive and complicated political and military interactions between Beijing, Washington, D.C., and Taipei. In addition to the missile tests, Beijing staged two large, air-sea military exercises that continued until March 25. The Clinton administration announced the dispatch of a second aircraft carrier on March 23, led by the USS Nimitz, coming from the Persian Gulf to the Western Pacific, near the Taiwan Strait. The USS Nimitz and its seven escort ships essentially doubled the size of the U.S. naval force off the coast of Taiwan when they joined the USS Independence. According to the U.S. military, both aircraft carriers were sent to serve as a stabilizing force, hoping to lower the chances of conflict between China and Taiwan.2 The ROC Ministry of National Defense also placed its naval forces on alert, upgrading combat readiness in closer preparation for war. It looked to the world as if there was going to be armed conflict.
Fortunately, all three sides turned to diplomacy to attempt to diffuse the tension. Bilateral diplomacy was increased between Washington, D.C. and Beijing, as well as between Washington, D.C. and Taipei. The director of Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council, Liu Huaqiu, was sent by the PRC government as a special envoy to Washington, D.C. to exchange views with top U.S. officials to discuss mounting military tensions; Ding Mou-shih, the chairman of the National Security Council of Taiwan, was also sent to the United States by President Lee Teng-hui to meet U.S. officials on the same issues. It is interesting that envoys from both sides of the Taiwan Strait were in the United States at approximately the same time, talking to separate groups of U.S. officials. The election resulted with President Lee Teng-hui winning re-election with approximately 54% of the popular vote. Post-election, the PRC suggested that its military exercises were successful, since Taiwan was not claiming independence; the Clinton Administration applauded the direct, democratic election and the fact that 'a bullet was dodged' in evading a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
As tensions were released in the Taiwan Strait, both Taiwan and the PRC demonstrated a stronger will to continue peaceful negotiations. The PRC, of course, reiterated its stance that force could be necessary, but blamed that necessity on 'foreign forces;' pretty much directly blaming the recent tension on the supposed influence that the United States had on Taiwan. In a report from the New China News Agency, PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated, "We have never undertaken to give up the use of force. This is not directed against the Taiwan compatriots, but against foreign forces attempting to interfere in China's internal affairs and make intrusions, and those on the island trying to bring about 'Taiwan independence.'"3 Of course, Taiwan continued to view the use of force as a direct threat from the communist leaders. The Clinton Administration continued to encourage direct diplomacy across the Taiwan Strait and re-emphasized its support of peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. According to a U.S. State Department official, "As soon as the situation calms down, we (the U.S.) would want to back away and let the two sides resume a productive exchange to resolve their problems."4 In essence, all sides were playing the diplomatic and military cards to the other side. But, it is necessary to look at the lessons learned from the crisis and previous years, and show how those lessons have been applied to the last five years, to understand the future of U.S.-Sino relations.
The crisis of March 1996 was a major turning point in U.S.-Sino relations, especially regarding the status of Taiwan. Prior to Taiwan's 1996 presidential election, the PRC feared that the re-election of Taiwan's President Lee would set the island on a course of calling for independence. This was, actually, a relatively new fear in the PRC's feeling about Taiwan. Up until the 1980's, both sides of the conflict were fighting for control over all of China, attempting to deal with the other as a "renegade" province, as Taiwan was seen by the PRC, and as an illegitimate, hopefully-temporary, controlling government, as the Communist Chinese were seen by Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist movement (Kuomintang). Thus, the split was merely over ideology, not nationality. China's sovereignty was never an issue. The communist leaders tolerated Chiang Kai-shek's labelling of the Communist Chinese as "bandits," and Taiwan dealt with being called a "renegade" province, since both sides were looking at the conflict through a "one-China" policy. Both sides learned to live with two political entities within "one China," with a natural understanding that both sides were committed to unifying China as their ultimate objective. This informal, shared understanding had contributed to peace and security in the Taiwan Strait for more than 30 years since the 1958 crisis.
However, beginning in the mid-1980s, political changes occurred in Taiwan. In 1988, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed, an opposition political party with independence on the top of its agenda. Furthermore, the Kuomintang, under President Lee Teng-hui, a strong supporter of Taiwan's identity, prompted Beijing to fear a shift from mere rival ideologies in the cross strait clash to a duel of nation states. The leaders of Taiwan were coming from a crop of Taiwan-born and raised citizens, with less connection to the mainland than that of their predecessors. Beijing's fear has clearly been demonstrated by its lasting stated conditions for the use of military force against Taiwan: specifically, a declaration of Taiwan independence. Realizing this, the majority of the people of Taiwan have supported just short of official calls for independence, and have for the most part been in favor of a diplomatic settlement to the issue of re-unification.
If Taiwan declared itself an independent sovereign state, however, Beijing's security interests would be severely compromised, undermining its position as a strengthening, regional power. Through its campaign for United Nations membership and its pursuit for expanded, bilateral diplomatic relationships, Taiwan increased Beijing's fears that the island was moving toward a call for independence. Between July and December 1995, Beijing ran military exercises in the Taiwan Strait to protest against President Lee Teng-hui's private visit to the United States to his alma mater, Cornell University, for a reunion in June 1995. Many in Beijing blamed this trip, and the U.S. decision to grant President Lee a visa, for the consequent tension of 1996, as it was seen as a ploy by the United States to infuse President Lee with the notion of calling for independence.
The consequent missile tests and combined military exercises in March 1996 further conveyed Beijing's anxiety that Taiwan would declare independence after the presidential election. Thus, the military exercises and missile launches were an attempt by the PRC to instill fear in the people of Taiwan as they went to the polls. Furthermore, the PRC was somewhat testing to see what response would come from the United States by the military actions. Some argue that they were effective in the legislative elections held prior to the 1996 presidential election, when the pro-Beijing faction tripled its number of seats in the legislative body.5 Yet, the March 1996 military exercises provided ammunition to the pro-Taiwan parties that the PRC was interested in a military confrontation. For the most part, the exercises alienated many of the Taiwanese people away from mainland China, as was viewed through President Lee's 54% victory in the election. There was, however, a new sense of fear brought into the hearts of many of Taiwan's citizens that a conflict was near. The United States was definitely not interested in armed conflict, but along with the PRC, the U.S. military was willing to "stage" a response in order to maintain security in the region. In essence, Beijing's "dual strategy" during the crisis was simply a staged event to test the waters and see the responses of both the Taiwan people and the United States.
Taiwan President Lee somewhat softened his approach to Beijing and initiated flexible policies to de-escalate cross strait tensions by offering an olive branch to Beijing in his May 1996 inauguration speech. In the inauguration speech, President Lee stated, "We will never negotiate under threat of attack, but we do not fear to negotiate. Our position is that dialogue will lead to the resolution of any issues between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait."6 By proposing direct dialogue to settle political disputes, President Lee was stating that he would not call for independence. Of course, he continued in his speech by saying that calling for independence was unnecessary, since the Republic of China had always been a sovereign state. His rhetoric, however, was toned down soon afterward at the specific request of the United States, in the interest of all parties involved.
Perhaps the biggest lesson from the March 1996 crisis was the fragility of the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. The opportunity for maintaining peace and security in the Taiwan Strait lies in whether both sides learn to live with the existing situation, allowing for re-unification only through dialogue and peaceful means. Both sides have learned that a major clash is likely, unless the status quo is maintained with the inclination toward diplomatic means of solution. However, there is no guarantee that rational behavior will always prevail and be exercised by both sides, unless a structure is put in place, or a mediator takes an active role to assist dialogue, while recognizing both sides' interests and security concerns.
Assuming that a peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue is in the interest of both sides of the Strait, prevention of a possible future crisis must be paramount. Steps that have been taken in the last few years since the 1996 crisis include: an increased pressure from the United States on Taiwan to re-ignite talks with the mainland and reassurance to the PRC that the United States upholds its "One-China" policy, as outlined in the Clinton administration's "Three 'No' Promises;" a higher level of evidence that the PRC is moving toward a more economically, interdependent position within the world trade system, and; a softening of 'independence' rhetoric coming from Taipei, even with its most recent presidential election of the Democratic Progressive Party candidate, Chen Shui-bian, who had called for Taiwan independence in the past. These three major points are the keys to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
From the perspective of the United States, security in the Asia-Pacific region is paramount to U.S. national interests, as well as global interests. As the PRC becomes one of the paramount economies and overall powers of the world, it will be necessary that the government in Beijing continue with the reforms that have been occurring over the last twenty years, but most importantly, those that have been occurring in the years since the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. The United States, although it remains steadfast in its official "One-China" policy, unofficially believes that military action on the part of the PRC to regain Taiwan is the most volatile action that can happen in the Asia-Pacific region. During a roundtable discussion during President Clinton's trip to Shanghai, the President reiterated U.S. policy in what has become known in China and Taiwan as the "Three-'No' Promises." President Clinton stated:
I do believe that my coming here and the work we've done in the last two years, President Jiang's trip to the United States, has helped to resolve some of the misunderstandings. I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy. Our only policy has been that we think it has to be done peacefully.7
Although this was made to be a large statement by the U.S. president, it was, in reality, a simple redeclaration of U.S. policy. The United States does not want the Taiwan issue to be resolved by military means. The U.S., over the last few years, has sought a comprehensive engagement policy toward China, in order to bring China into the global marketplace. Through this policy, the United States hopes that Beijing will have no choice but to play by the international rules and solve the situation peacefully.
Through its engagement policy, the United States has supported China's ascension into the WTO. Beijing's willingness to comply with the international rules, and their further agreement to successful trade negotiations with the United States and the European Union, has demonstrated its tendency toward reform. This is the exact willingness that the United States, along with the overall consensus in Taiwan, is looking for from the PRC leaders. In a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in China, Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) Shi Guangsheng said:
China-U.S. trade and economic relations have become an important part of the overall relations between the two countries, " Shi said. "The settlement of the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR), which troubled the development of trade and economic relations for years, has shown again that to develop a healthy and stable China-US trade and economic relations serve the common interests of both sides, and that is also the common desire of people in both countries.8
Through economic interdependence, which will be an inevitable fact through China's WTO entry, China will most likely be willing to utilize diplomatic, peaceful means to dealing with Taiwan re-unification.
Along with Beijing's willingness to open up economically, which will lead to a more democratic-leaning, economically interdependent PRC, the leaders of Taipei must not reinvigorate the wounds between the PRC and Taiwan by calling for independence. President Chen Shue-bien must continue with the softening of rhetoric and increase its willingness to actively pursue diplomatic negotiations with the PRC. In a press conference on August 28, Taiwan's president stated, "We wish to follow the spirit of dialogue and exchange and set aside controversies, so that the two sides can meet and talk to improve cross-strait relations, while seeking a mutually acceptable definition of 'one China.' I wholeheartedly believe that such a definition cannot be unilaterally decided and manipulated by any single nation, political party, or people. We must meet and discuss it together. The outcome is true and final only when it is acceptable to both sides."9 So, as long as President Chen continues this line of thinking and is willing to talk to the leaders in Beijing, a military confrontation can be avoided. Since both sides seem willing to avoid such a confrontation, after seeing how close one came in 1996, it is necessary to actually take some diplomatic action.
One option that the United States should pursue is a more involved role in the re-ignition of the talks. Although Beijing and Taiwan have stated that bilateral talks, without outside interference, are necessary, it could be helpful for the United States to host the talks on American soil, so both sides would feel that talks were taking place in more neutral territory. It is interesting to note that during the high point of the of mainland's missile tests in 1996, special envoys were sent by Beijing and Taipei to Washington, D.C. and New York to conduct separate bilateral dialogues with different U.S. policy makers. With the United States serving as the host of indirect, "preventive diplomacy," leaders of both sides of the Strait were provided an opportunity of confidence building in terms of understanding each other's intentions and tolerance limits. Furthermore, both sides were acknowledging the fact that the United States was going to, and was willing to, play a vital role in the re-unification process. After the crisis, scholars from both sides participated in discussions and exchanges on the military and security situation in the Strait. This active dialogue was the best way to diffuse the situation, and should be pursued, and promoted, by the United States through a third-party role in the re-unification process. In this capacity, the United States can please both sides of the Strait and can hopefully assist the leaders of both sides to begin to bring about the necessary dialogue that will lead to continued stability in the region.
The People's Republic of China, over the last five years since the Taiwan Strait Crisis, has attempted to raise its diplomatic profile within the international community. The leaders in Beijing, with all of their hard rhetoric toward Taiwan, realize that the missile launches and military tests of 1996 alienated many of the citizens of Taiwan, as well as made the PRC look belligerent in the eyes of most of the world. With increases in exchanges between the PRC and Taiwan, through educational, political, and economic policies, both sides are attempting to create an atmosphere conducive to a globalizing world. All participants believe that a peaceful resolution is the best way to regain global support for a unified China.
With the increased importance that the United States has placed on economic interdependence between the United States and the PRC in the last few years, it has determined that the new policy of engagement is a much healthier, safer, and secure policy to follow in order to reach its goal of stability in the Asia-Pacific region, specifically with regard to the Taiwan Strait. Thus, the United States has actively pursued the ascension of the PRC, and Taiwan, into the WTO, bringing the government and people of the PRC into the global economy. It is a belief throughout the United States, and much of the developed world, that through economic dependence, the PRC government will be less inclined to start a conflict over Taiwan, with increased levels of possible loss, in terms of economics, from an armed conflict. With increased willingness to have a higher level of dialogue between the leaders of the PRC and Taiwan, both sides are acknowledging that military means of resolution to re-unification is the most mutually un-beneficial policy.
Lessons were learned from the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996 by all participants. The United States realized that it would need to take a more active role in promoting reforms in the PRC through its comprehensive engagement policy, as well as solidifying its "one-China policy." As it continues to support democracy in Taiwan, its dual policy allows it to maintain relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, putting the United States in a prime position to assist negotiations toward re-unification. The PRC has opened itself to the idea of economic reform, allowing for the possibility that globalization will be the driving force in its foreign policy. As its economic position rises in the world market, the PRC will be more reliant on the international community for its continued prosperity, and it will be more inclined to work toward diplomatic resolution to its Taiwan problem. Finally, Taiwan's leaders learned that the PRC is willing to utilize force if Taiwan calls for independence, but understands that a softer rhetoric will lead to bilateral talks with the Beijing leadership. Once bilateral talks begin, and if they are maintained in a diplomatic and peaceful manner while maintaining the status quo, the path toward stability and security across the Taiwan Strait will lead to a more democratic, unified China.
1 Although this was proposed on the Senate floor after the missile tests began, it gives a valid picture as to the numerous Congressional documents that were created on the subject of security in the Taiwan Strait during this volatile period. Both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate passed bills that had similar language."Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the United States is Committed to Military Stability in Taiwan Strait," United States Senate, March 21, 1996. (http://www.ece.nwu.edu/~laurent/taiwan/26.html).
2 "Nimitz battle group will be in position near Taiwan on Sunday," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March 23, 1996.
3 "China says Taiwan election shows that voters oppose separation from mainland," The New York Times, March 23, 1996.
4 "ANALYSIS: U.S. hopes Taiwan election will end crisis," Reuters, March 21, 1996.
5 "Key dates in China-Taiwan relations," Cox News Service, March 21, 1996.
6 Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-Hui's Inauguration Speech, May 20, 1996. (www.chinaonline.com).
7 "Remarks by the President and the First Lady In Discussion on Shaping China For the 21st Century" Shanghai Library, Shanghai, People's Republic of China, June 30, 1998 (www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/China).
8 Ministry of Foreign and Economic Cooperation website (http://www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec).
9 The Office of the President of the Republic of China Website, Press Briefing, August 28, 2000, (http://www.oop.gov.tw/index_e.html).
"Expressing the Sense of the Congress that the United States is Committed to Military Stability in Taiwan Strait," United States Senate Floor Remarks, March 21, 1996 (http://www.ece.nwu.edu/~laurent/taiwan/26.html)
"Nimitz battle group will be in position near Taiwan on Sunday," Seattle Post-Intelligencer Editorial, March 23, 1996 (http://www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/morechina)
"China says Taiwan election shows that voters oppose separation from mainland," The New York Times Editorial, March 23, 1996 (http://www.nytimes.com)
"ANALYSIS: U.S. hopes Taiwan election will end crisis," Reuters Editorial, March 21, 1996 (http://www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/morechina)
"Key dates in China-Taiwan relations," Cox News Service, March 21, 1996 (http://www.nando.net/newsroom/nt/morechina)
Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-Hui's Inauguration Speech, May 20, 1996 (www.chinaonline.com)
"Remarks by the President and the First Lady In Discussion on Shaping China For the 21st Century," Shanghai Library, Shanghai, People's Republic of China, June 30, 1998 (www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/China)
Ministry of Foreign and Economic Cooperation website (http://www.moftec.gov.cn/moftec)
The Office of the President of the Republic of China Website, Press Briefing, August 28, 2000, (http://www.oop.gov.tw/index_e.html)
Chinese Foreign Ministry Website information on China-U.S. Relations (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english)
Steven Levine, "Sino-American Relations: Practicing Damage Control," in Samuel Kim, ed., China and the World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998)
Robert Ross, "Engaging in U.S.-China Policy," in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross, Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power (London: Routhledge, 1999)
Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" Foreign Affairs, September/October 1999
James L. Watson, "China's Big Mac Attack," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000.