"Both President Bush and Secretary of State Powell have expressed their sincere regret over your missing pilot and aircraft. Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wang Wei that we are very sorry for their loss."
---Letter to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan from U.S. Ambassador Joseph Prueher, April 11, 2001
"Sorry." "Regret." "Saddened." "Whatever it takes." These words and phrases are often thrown around in everyday life, but in the world of international diplomatic relations, the words that a nation or its leaders choose often have greater meaning than the actual definition of the words. The world has witnessed this phenomenon, most recently, during the still-ongoing aftermath of the collision of the United States spy plane and the Chinese fighter jet in April 2001, as well as in President Bush's blunder with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. Since the collision, the United States and the People's Republic of China have had increasingly tense relations. These relations, following a relatively strong eight years of diplomatic exchange, strong potential of highly increased economic interaction, and relatively peaceful military relations under the Clinton Administration, have been wandering slowly toward a more hard line approach from both sides. This approach, of course, is exactly what the current U.S. Administration, under George W. Bush, has been looking for since the early days of then-Governor Bush's campaign for President. Unfortunately, this overall policy of "strategic competition" has the potential to cause another Cold War, and quite possibly, direct military conflict.
U.S. President George W. Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin, both considered to be moderates in their respective parties, have bowed in recent weeks to hard line, conservative forces, while the future of positive, bilateral relations are at stake. Both leaders need to re-evaluate and redefine their current strategies to a point where the people of both nations are on path toward a mutually beneficial relationship. Most importantly, the United States, since it is coming from a more economically sound, militarily capable, and democratically based position, needs to take a leadership role in bringing the bilateral relationship with China, the largest nation in the Asian region, toward a relationship based on cooperation and mutual trust. This is the best way for the United States to bring security to the Asia-Pacific region and create a more economically interdependent Asia. Furthermore, this has been the policy of the United States since U.S. President Nixon first went to Beijing in 1972.
To the harm of the longstanding bilateral policy, the current Bush policies toward the Asia-Pacific region, especially toward China, have many flavors of a Cold War policy toward the Soviet Union. By placing the military at the top of its policy agenda, the Bush Administration is signalling to the rest of the world that there is a need to be fearful, either of the United States or the United States of its "competitors." Unfortunately, fear only instils more fear, and fear leads to irrationality. As U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said, "The only thing we have to fearŠis fear itself." Although that statement was originally made during a time of mobilization for World War II, another interpretation of the statement rings true today. If the United States instils fear in China or its neighbors, there is ultimately only going to be increasing hostility between the United States and China, the potential leader of Asia.
In the relationship between the two great nations, words have always had to be delicately used to maintain a fragile relationship and appease factions within both nations, especially regarding the status of Taiwan. Unfortunately, the current U.S. president is not a great orator. Much has been made about his common gaffes of words and phrases throughout the 2000 U.S. presidential campaign and through his first three months in office. In fact, just recently, President Bush's advisors had to back-pedal after a statement regarding U.S. policy toward Taiwan, which instilled fear and uncertainty in the minds of the Chinese leadership. In a world of sound bytes and media spin, President Bush is a duck out of water. Unfortunately, his recent policy decisions toward China and the rest of Asia don't provide him with much of a pond to swim in.
This paper will first look at the historical Sino-American relationship since 1972 and the role that delicate wording has played between the two nations. Furthermore, this paper will analyze the recent Asian policy decisions and linguistic mess-ups of the current U.S. president that have played a role in the tensing of relations. To that end, a policy prescription will be offered as a solution to the currently strained relationship between the United States and China.
When U.S. President Richard Nixon arrived in Beijing to meet with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the two leaders began a process of normalization of relations. From the standpoint of the United States, the strategic partnership with the P.R.C. was a direct policy of containment of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, with the Vietnam War on the brink of ending with a loss for the United States, President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger realized that another foothold was necessary in Asia in order to maintain the U.S. position, militarily and economically, in the region. The P.R.C. sought to have greater overall security in the Asia-Pacific theater, requiring, however, a decreased level of U.S. involvement in the area. In the first of three Joint Communiqués, the Chinese leaders stated:
...All nations, big or small, should be equal: big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries...
This statement makes very clear that the P.R.C. did not seek to be a superpower, nor did they think that the United States should be a hegemony. Specifically, the Chinese were targeting the United States position in Asia, and attempting to circumvent the U.S. position by creating a stronger relationship with the Western nation. Furthermore, the principal impediment to normalized relations, prior to 1972, was the P.R.C. position that Taiwan is part of China and that official U.S. relations with Taiwan constitute an infringement on P.R.C. sovereignty. Privately, President Nixon gave Premier Zhou Enlai assurance that the United States accepted that Taiwan is a part of China and that the United States would not support Taiwan's independence.
The public position of the United States, however, was that the United States "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." In 1972, that was technically correct: the United States was acknowledging a fundamental point on which the governments of the P.R.C. and Taiwan agreed, i.e., that Taiwan is part of China. Of course, Beijing and Taipei each claimed sovereignty over the Chinese state.
American diplomats negotiated with their Chinese counterparts about the exact words used in the Shanghai Communiqué, as the first statement came to be called, that would assert the U.S. position so that Beijing would view the statement as an adequate basis for a bilateral agreement. The U.S. negotiators were delicate in not necessarily agreeing with Beijing's view. In fact, in the actual communiqué, the U.S. does not "accept" Beijing's position on the matter of Taiwan; it only "acknowledges" it.
This was the first of many linguistic dances utilized by the United States to maintain the appearance of impartiality between the P.R.C. and Taiwan, maximize its diplomatic channels in the Asia-Pacific region, and avoid stating a preference about the outcome of the conflict between Taipei and Beijing over the issue of sovereignty. This diplomatic two-step is the cornerstone of a U.S. policy of "ambiguity" on cross-Strait issues. Regarding the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan, some believe however, "the American position is not ambiguous; it is subtle." Regarding the manner in which the cross-Strait dispute ought to be resolved, though, the United States has stated firmly its "interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese [people] themselves."
In the 1979 "Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China," the United States went further by stating that it "recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." It also "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China." The wording of the Communiqué was once again a diplomatic strengthening of ties between the P.R.C. and the United States, even though there was immense political pressure back in the United States to openly support Taiwan.
These domestic pressures became the basis of what ultimately became the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of April 1979. The United States Congress was not against normalizing relations with the P.R.C. It recognized that American strategic and economic interests were obviously advanced by stable relations with Beijing. The feeling in Congress, however, was that the United States couldn't essentially turn its back on a long-time ally (Taiwan), as Beijing clearly wanted. Thus, the TRA states that the United States will make available to Taiwan "arms of a defensive character" and reserves the right of the United States to determine "appropriate action" in the event of "any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan."
In Beijing's view, the wording in the TRA violated the spirit of the two joint communiqués. By expressing a determination to arm Taiwan and consider defending it from threats to its welfare or security, the United States appeared in Beijing's eyes to be impeding unification. The language used in the TRA, of course, was highly sensitive and of course caused a great deal of tension in Beijing. This tension led P.R.C. leaders to issue an ultimatum in 1982: either the United States would end its arms sales to Taiwan, or Beijing would reassess the future of its relations with the United States. The Reagan administration took this threat seriously and entered into negotiations, which resulted in the 1982 "Joint Communiqué on U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan," the third, and most recent, Communiqué. In this document, Washington tried to reassure Beijing by stating that it had "no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.'" The United States further stated that it:
ŠDoes not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or quantitative terms the level of those supplied in recent yearsŠand that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.
Many observers see this final Communiqué and the TRA as contradictory. Even if they are contradictory, however, the United States has continued to provide arms to Taiwan. Washington has defended its sales by reference to economic inflation and a domestic political determination that the United States would help Taiwan maintain the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait as the P.R.C. itself enhances its military capabilities. Of course, the United States has also maintained its diplomatic and official ties with Beijing; the entire time talking out of both sides of its mouth&emdash;choosing the words carefully, of course.
From Washington's point of view, the P.R.C. has not always shown evidence of looking toward a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question. Not only has Beijing refused to officially renounce the use of force, but it also continues to build up its military capabilities along the south eastern coast of China, seemingly readying itself for a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
Fortunately, over the course of the last two decades, trade and economic interdependence between the United States and the P.R.C. increased; the Cold War came to an end; international organizations helped to develop the international agenda; and, the relationship between the two nations, although bumpy at times, became a more sound, diplomatically-based, mutually beneficial relationship.
Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the P.R.C. and the United States has been further defined by many of these issues, including increased hope of economic interdependence, with the P.R.C. on the brink of accession to the World Trade Organization, regional security, including issues regarding North Korean nuclear build up, global environmental concerns, and human rights abuses. Each of these areas are continually being resurfaced and mutually linked to one another in multilateral discussions and agreements, bilateral, government-level talks, and increased societal exchanges. Furthermore, the increased economic interdependence, which will become even more of the cornerstone to the relationship in the future than it is now, has been on the top of the agenda of both nations' bilateral foreign policies in the form of a policy moving toward China's WTO accession.
The Clinton Administration followed a strict policy of "engagement" in its relations with the P.R.C. and continued to utilize the necessary language in its habitual ambiguity of its policy toward Beijing and Taiwan. President Clinton, during his 1998 trip to China, stated:
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member of any organization for which statehood is a requirement.
Of course, even this statement, from an experienced orator and a leader who has been called a "policy-wonk," set off a "firestorm" in Republican circles in Washington, D.C. and in Taiwan. In a policy report from the conservative think-tank, The Heritage Foundation's Stephen Yates wrote that President Clinton's "statement in Shanghai departed from the carefully nuanced language that has allowed the United States to conduct relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait in a manner that promotes peace and prosperity. The words President Clinton chose to use in Shanghai&emdash;words used by no previous President&emdash;have put the people of Taiwan at a severe disadvantage in their 50-year struggle with the communist government of mainland China." The fact of the matter is that the island of Taiwan needs the support of the United States, and the United States is attempting to acquire that reliance from the P.R.C. through its economic engagement. Thus, the blow from the wording of President Clinton's statement, although a first, was backed up by a positive-looking policy toward both Taiwan and the P.R.C. The former President realized that a hard line stance would only invigorate tense military build-up and decrease chances of a peaceful resolution to the problems in the Taiwan Strait.
The main theory behind President Clinton's approach, it was thought, is that when China becomes a full-fledged member of the WTO, the world will begin to see a new China. This new China will be brought into the global marketplace, and will strategically create a China that is interdependent with the rest of the economies of the WTO. Through a U.S. policy of engagement that will lead to global access to China's markets, it is thought that China will be more inclined to use diplomacy and economic means, rather than military aggression or the threat of aggression, in order to solve regional and global disputes. Of course, liberal theorists realize that although there will be increased economic interdependence, there will continue to be areas of contention between China and the international community.
The world saw two specific instances of possible escalation during President Clinton's term, specifically the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the "accidental" bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by U.S.-led NATO forces. The "accidental" bombing of the Chinese Embassy very well could have brought the two nations to confrontation, but was instead solved through diplomatic and economic relations. President Clinton realized this and immediately called President Jiang to say he was "sorry." That simple phone call allowed President Jiang to make a more moderate decision and call for diplomatic talks, rather than a military response. Thus, a joint, monetary settlement was made by negotiators from both sides, and both sides realized that their future economic relations were of paramount importance to the stability and growth of the Asian region.
The 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis was brought on through increased verbal rhetoric between Beijing and Taipei surrounding the elections in Taiwan, as well as the P.R.C.'s missile tests off the coast of Taiwan. Through diplomatic channels and increased dialogue, a military confrontation was avoided. Furthermore, all sides involved realized that increased, peaceful interaction between the three nations were necessary. The United States realized that it would need to take a more active role in promoting reforms in the P.R.C. through its comprehensive engagement policy, as well as solidifying its "one-China policy." As it continues to support democracy in Taiwan, its dual policy allows it to maintain relations with both sides of the Taiwan Strait, putting the United States in a prime position to assist negotiations toward re-unification. The P.R.C. had opened itself to the idea of economic reform, allowing for the possibility that globalization will be the driving force in its foreign policy. As its economic position rises in the world market, the P.R.C. understood that it will be more reliant on the international community for its continued prosperity, and it will be more inclined to work toward diplomatic resolution to its Taiwan problem. Finally, Taiwan's leaders learned that the P.R.C. was willing to utilize force if Taiwan calls for independence, but understands that a softer rhetoric will lead to bilateral talks with the Beijing leadership.
The Clinton Administration built upon the China policies of former President Bush, which called to actively engage China. Without a hard line approach, the United States, it was thought, could avoid a military build-up in both Taiwan and the P.R.C., as well as create an atmosphere of partnership and stability in the Asian region. Although tensions often rose, due to misunderstandings or accidents, in a world where verbal nuances play such an important role, it is important to have a policy that will cushion any escalation in tension as a result of those misunderstandings or accidents. Unfortunately, the current U.S. President has pursued a hard line policy toward the P.R.C. that will make it difficult to ease tensions that have recently arisen due to misunderstandings or accidents.
George W. Bush is not a great orator. Nor is he fluent in the words of the world of international politics. From the early days of his campaign for President, then-Governor Bush's international policy was clearly Republican. In a Foreign Affairs article entitled, "Promoting the National Interest," Bush's National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote that the Bush Administration should refocus the United States' foreign policy on the national interest and "to:
Clearly, Ms. Rice outlined a hard line policy, based in the realist tradition. This policy, which has been implemented during the Administration's first one hundred days in office, is a clear change from the liberal policies, focused on economics, that seemed to be in tune with the international trend of globalization. The current Administration's policies seem to be more in line with the era of the Cold War, with a few twinges of the modern era. Furthermore, as it has been argued earlier, in a world where the careful choice of words are of the utmost importance for international diplomacy and interaction to be successful, it not necessarily the most beneficial situation to have a "leader of the free world" that quite often has verbal miscalculations and a foreign policy that doesn't seem to be in the international interest.
Within the Asia-Pacific region, the administration has pursued a hard line policy that has many questioning the administration's motives. Some say that the administration would have an easier time building up its military in the face of an enemy, even if that enemy were "created" by talk and miscalculations. Others feel that the United States wants to keep China weak, in order to maintain a strong foothold in the Asian region. In reality, though, the intention is not as important as the results of a policy.
Toward China, the United States, under President Bush, has considered the Asian nation to be a "strategic competitor," rather than a regional partner. The current policy "Šrequires nuance and balance. It is important to promote China's internal transition through economic interaction while containing Chinese power and security ambitions." In addition, President Bush has made it clear that strengthening ties with South Korea and Japan are crucial to containing Chinese power. All of these issues have been brought to the forefront of international politics in recent months and have decreased the strength of the ties between the United States and China.
A number of very clear examples of President Bush's hard line policies, in recent months, have led to the most recent tensions between the United States and China. First of all, of course, is the recent spy plane incident of April 1, 2001. Initially, President Bush actually handled the situation well, utilizing diplomatic means to negotiating the return of the spy plane crew. Also, the critical nuance of language used in the "apology" letter demonstrated an initial understanding of the importance that words in international diplomacy. The crew was eventually returned. Since the plane was detained for 11 days, and the plane remains in Chinese custody, however, the Bush team has taken a harder line toward Beijing. Furthermore, the President and his team have thrown around threats of linking this event, which was really simply an accident, to China's WTO accession, its bid for the 2008 Olympic Games, and overall Sino-American relations.
These threats are simply antagonizing China and creating an atmosphere of fear and miscommunication. For example, U.S.-Chinese contacts are now being reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, and more importantly, President Bush approved the largest arms sale package ever for Taiwan, said he would do "whatever it takes" to defend the island, and will apparently allow Taiwan's president to meet congressmen when he crosses the United States on a trip to Central America. The statement of "whatever it takes" caused the Administration to back-pedal and make clear that the President was not changing U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Once again, it was apparent that President Bush hasn't grasped the effect of a poorly thought-out statement on international ties.
President Bush's decision to move forward with a missile defense system has also worsened relations, although some argue that the president's hard line stance will make it more likely in the long run that Beijing takes him seriously. This may be true, but the overall tone of what is coming out of President Bush's White House is creating the most tense relations between the two nations in quite a long time. Furthermore, the President authorized the resumption of the spy plane flights off the coast of China, with talk of utilizing U.S. fighter jets as protection. In a smart move, China is attempting to use diplomatic channels to cease the spy plane missions, as it has lodged an official complaint with the U.S. Embassy. The possible use of "protective" U.S. fighter jets simply implies that the Chinese military is seen as a threat to the U.S. spying. This is a hypocritical stance for the United States to take. No spy plane would be allowed to continue missions off the coast of the United States. Furthermore, President Bush fails to realize (or maybe he does) that a tense relationship will only cause China to increase military spending. In return, the United States will have to continue to improve Taiwan's military, and a new arms race will be upon the world. This is not something that should be promoted by the current U.S. leadership.
The handling of the spy plane incident can easily be compared to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy. Both were essentially accidents. The spy plane incident, however, didn't have the cushion of a positive China policy that assisted in diffusing tensions. The hard line Bush policy is simply increasing tensions and is ill-equipped to keep an accidental situation from escalating.
The second serious verbal gaffe of the President within his Asian affairs policy was his handling of the visit of South Korea's Kim Dae-jung. President Bush criticized President Kim's attempts to normalize relations with North Korea, referred to as the "Sunshine Policy," by playing up his own serious doubts about North Korea's trustworthiness. Furthermore, President Bush continued the hard line stance by delaying indefinitely U.S. re-engagement with the North, especially on missile talks. Both President Bush and President Kim described their discussions as "frank," which often is a diplomatic term for tough and involving disagreements. Overall, President Bush's handling of the meeting constituted "one of the most serious diplomatic blunders of the post-Cold War era." When the President Bush stated that he had no definite plans to resume negotiations with North Korea to curb the North's ballistic missile program, he "clearly blind-sided President Kim and put him in an extremely embarrassing position." Members of Bush's team once again had to back-pedal and re-establish that the United States was in favor of a peaceful dialogue between the two Korean nations.
Both of these examples demonstrate that the current U.S. leadership is directing the nation from a standpoint of arrogance and miscalculations. Within the last few months, the United States has been thrown off the United Nations Human Rights panel and anti-drug trafficking panel, which hurts the United States' international position and the world's people. No matter how one looks at it, the United States plays a key role in international relations. Many nations&emdash;including U.S. allies in Europe&emdash;are angry at the Bush Administration's rejection of an international agreement to reduce global warming (the Kyoto treaty) and its plans to push ahead with a new missile defense system. President Bush has also refused to ratify the treaty creating an international criminal court, and the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the nuclear test ban treaty. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, "Member states, particularly those who have been very strongly supportive of the international criminal court, have been disappointed by the U.S. not coming on board." Furthermore, the United States still hasn't paid a great deal of its back-dues and has gone for four months without an ambassador to the U.N., demonstrating the importance that the Bush Administration places on its role in the major international organizations. Many within the United States have accused the Bush Administration of retreating from a leading role worldwide, arguing that the United States can do more to ensure its national security, and the security of the world, by participating in international organizations.
The United States needs to believe that the effort to reduce tensions around the world is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation as a result of accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding. This is the basis of a strong engagement policy. The Bush Administration needs to re-examine its current hard line policy to see the actual damage that it is causing to the position and power of the United States in the global framework. A policy of overall engagement is necessary, especially within the Asian region. Engagement will seek to maximize bilateral ties between the United States and China, while keeping any disputes at as low a level as possible. Rather than alienating China, the United States should attempt to include China in the solution of regional issues, as it began during the Clinton years.
One possible initiative that President Bush can take is to facilitate an informal meeting with President Jiang, before the Chinese leader leaves office. Furthermore, it will be necessary, once China can determine President Jiang's successor, to set up a formal summit, whereby the two sides could iron out a new Communiqué for the post-Cold War era. A meeting such as this could gradually increase the amount of trust between the two leaders. Furthermore, by building a more personal relationship, President Bush can more easily call upon the Chinese leaders to act in a more moderate, responsible way.
By no means, of course, should the United States allow China to go unchecked, in terms of academic detentions, environmental standards, human rights abuses, military build-up, and hard line political stances. China should be pressured to reform its stances on many of these issues. Yet, a policy of engagement is more suited to appeal to the better nature of the Chinese leadership, rather than the current Bush policy of confrontational rhetoric and hard line policy actions. Since the words that the U.S. President uses say a great deal more to the rest of the world than simple casual talk, it is necessary to have a strong policy of engagement activities to cushion the unusual amount of hard line rhetoric that is emanating out of the current U.S. Administration. Only a change in the current policy will assist in easing of the tensions that have escalated over the last few months.
President Bush should take a look at the actions of his father, as well as President Reagan to gain a better perspective as to the fine line that he must walk when dealing with China and the Asian region. Of course, the past three Presidents have taken time early in their Administrations to formulate a sound foreign policy. In fact, President Clinton was criticized throughout his first term for hardly having a coherent foreign policy. Thus, there is still hope for the current President to find a policy that will promote comprehensive security, economic growth, and political liberalization outside U.S. borders.
Along with globalization has come the increase in importance of diplomacy and carefully worded statements in the realm of foreign policy. This is no more apparent than in the United States' policy and relations with Asia, particularly China. Since taking office, President George W. Bush has taken a hard line stance toward China, which has made it difficult to deal with some of the accidents, miscalculation, and misunderstandings that have occurred in recent months. As George W. Bush learns his way around the Oval Office, it is of paramount importance that a sound policy is in place that will cushion the often hard line rhetoric, and occasional verbal gaffe, that emanates from the that Office. This policy should not be one of confrontation and Cold War thinking. Rather, a policy more in line with the theory of engagement should head up America's policy toward China.
With a policy of engagement, the United States can continue to ride the fine line that is necessary to keep a stable environment across the Taiwan Strait. When the United States acts in a way that antagonizes China, the Bush Administration is acting from a theory of instilling fear. Through fear comes irrationality. Through irrationality comes conflict. The current policy can easily lead to another Cold War-style military build-up. Most importantly, the United States, since it is coming from a more economically sound, militarily capable, and democratically based position needs to take a leadership role in bringing the bilateral relationship with China, the largest nation in the Asian region, toward a relationship based on cooperation and mutual trust. Although tensions will inevitably rise, due to misunderstandings or accidents, in a world where verbal nuances play such an important role, it is important to have a policy that will cushion any escalation in tension as a result of those misunderstandings or accidents. This is the best way for the United States to bring security to the Asia-Pacific region and create a more economically interdependent Asia.
Clinton, President William Jefferson in Shanghai, 1998. Found at the Chinese Washington, D.C. Embassy website, http://www.china-embassy.org.
"Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China," February 28, 1972, http://www.fmprc.gov/cn/english.
"Joint Communiqué of the P.R.C. and the United States," August 17, 1982, U.S. Embassy in Beijing Website, http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/politics/index.html
Keeney, Spurgeon, Lateline News.com Online Article, http://news.muzi.com/ll/english/1060915.shtml
Rice, Condoleezza, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000.
Taiwan Relations Act, http://ait.org.tw/ait/tra.html.
Wachman, Alan, "Challenges and Opportunities in the Taiwan Strait: Defining America's Role," National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Policy Paper, January 2001.
YahooNews!, www.yahoo.com, May 8, 2001.
Yates, Stephen, "Clinton Statement Undermines Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, July 10, 1998, Heritage Foundation Website, http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em538.html.
Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, February 28, 1972 (http://www.fmprc.gov/cn/english).
Ibid.
Alan Wachman, "Challenges and Opportunities in the Taiwan Strait: Defining America's Role," National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Policy Paper, January 2001.
Shanghai Communiqué
Taiwan Relations Act, http://ait.org.tw/ait/tra.html.
Wachman.
"Joint Communiqué of the P.R.C. and the United States," August 17, 1982, U.S. Embassy in Beijing Website, http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/english/politics/index.html
Ibid.
President William Jefferson Clinton in Shanghai, 1998. Found at the Chinese Washington, D.C. Embassy website, http://www.china-embassy.org.
Stephen Yates, "Clinton Statement Undermines Taiwan," The Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum, July 10, 1998, Heritage Foundation Website, http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em538.html.
Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000.
Ibid.
Spurgeon Keeney of the Arms Control Association, Lateline News.com Online Article, http://news.muzi.com/ll/english/1060915.shtml
Ibid.
YahooNews!, www.yahoo.com, May 8, 2001.