The People's Republic of China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its acquisition of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status with the United States are vital for the future economic prosperity of its 1.3 billion people. China's access, however, will also have a calculated effect on the 22 million people on the island of Taiwan. In recent years, Taiwan has shifted so many of its industrial production facilities to the mainland of China that denial of PNTR would have had a negative economic and political impact on Taiwan's economy. Furthermore, due to an informal agreement reached in 1992, the WTO will not act on Taiwan's application to the WTO until China has been admitted. As a result, Taiwan has emerged as one of the strongest proponents of granting China membership in the WTO as soon as possible. Within the United States, it is believed that once both China and Taiwan have joined the organization, there is reason to hope that increased diplomatic interaction and economic interdependence will encourage peaceful relations across the often unstable Taiwan Strait.

On November 15, 1999, the United States and China signed a bilateral agreement on China's accession to the WTO, and on May 24, 2000, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 237 to 197 in favor of granting China permanent normal trade relations status, a trade status that the United States had granted to almost all of its trade partners previously. These historic accords were ratified by the U.S. Senate soon afterward. It is widely believed that these agreements will potentially revolutionize China's economy and could have an impressive impact on economic, political, and diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan in coming years. For the United States, the trade agreements could alleviate inherent problems that have been encountered in dealings with China and Taiwan, since a multilateral forum, like the WTO, will provide the international pressure that the United States often seeks to maintain global security. Thus, increased economic prosperity for both sides of the Taiwan Strait, which would be gained through access to the WTO, will hopefully lead to a greater level of regional security in the Asia-Pacific and develop peaceful, diplomatic reunification talks between China and Taiwan.

Accession to the WTO is a complex process and each negotiation for admission has proceeded on its own pace, based entirely on economic factors and the willingness of applicants to meet WTO obligations. This essentially non-political process has been a critical source of strength and credibility for the WTO, and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

China's contemporary interest in GATT membership began seriously in 1987, when the organization created a "working party" to examine the question of China's entry. In September 1992, the GATT created another working party to consider Taiwan 's application. The GATT council agreed to consider the report of the China working party first. At the same time, the council decided that the two applications should be considered independently.¹ WTO membership is open to "customs territories" rather than "states," which coincides with the the United States' current "one-China" policy that has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Sino relations in the last few years. So, officially, Taiwan does not need to be a sovereign state in order to gain entry to the global trading marketplace.

The vote on PNTR with China and the issue of China's accession to the WTO are, of course, not synonymous. Having completed its bilateral negotiations with the United States, China can enter the WTO as soon as its negotiations with other members are resolved and the final issues are agreed upon, which will happen in the next few months; this entry was not contingent upon Congressional action to grant PNTR. The main reason the U.S. Congress decided to grant PNTR status was to allow American businesses, and the American people, to take part in the concessions won in the complex process of integrating China into the world trading community.

For Taiwan, both WTO accession and passage of PNTR for China are critical, promising to have a lasting impact on Taiwan's economic development and future, political stability. Taiwan's leaders promptly welcomed the November 1999 U.S.-China bilateral WTO agreement. Among the first statements made by the new president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, after his election on March 18, 2000, was a call for "the normalization of U.S.-China trade relations" and China's accession to the World Trade Organization.² In his inauguration speech, President Chen stated, "...As long as the governments and people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can interact more, following the principles of 'goodwill reconciliation, active cooperation, and permanent peace,' while at the same time respecting the free choice of the people and excluding unnecessary obstacles, both sides of the Strait can make great contributions to the prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides will also create a glorious civilization for humanity."³ In subsequent statements to the press, President Chen asserted that integration of China into the global trading community would facilitate democratization and thereby foster peace across the Strait.

On April 12, 2000, the Heritage Foundation sponsored a video-teleconference between members of the United States Congress and President Chen, who explicitly called upon the American congressmen to help both China and Taiwan enter the WTO, reminding them that "normal trade with China does much more than promote China's economic development. It also promotes Taiwan'sŠeconomic growth." Chen's efforts to improve China's odds of gaining PNTR departed from past Kuomintang (KMT) practice, which was usually filled with attempts to stop recognition of China as a legitimate member of the international community.⁴ Finally, Taipei's new leadership, in spite of strong, negative rhetoric from Beijing, never suggested that PNTR be used as a bargaining chip against China in order to compel China toward better behavior.

Taiwan sees China's PNTR status and WTO membership as crucial for two reasons. The primary motive is Taipei's desire to enter the WTO. Although U.S. policy does not link admission of Taiwan to a successful application by China, most members of the WTO have accepted the idea that Taiwan will not gain entry until China is admitted. Back in 1992, the PRC reached a deal with the United States on terms of Taiwan's admission into the GATT, the precursor to the WTO. The deal being that Taiwan would be admitted only after the mainland had been let in--even though Taiwan's economy and legal structure qualified it for entry long before mainland China. Moreover, Taiwan would not join as a nation but rather as the "separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu."⁵ However, most of the members of the WTO have agreed that both China and Taiwan will be admitted at the same WTO session, and that entry will most likely happen early in 2001. This has alleviated much of Taiwan's concern, but the issue goes much deeper than that. Taiwan has moved so much of its manufacturing to the mainland in recent years that any tampering with normal trade relations between the United States and China also has the potential to circumscribe Taiwan's economy severely.

Taiwan is now China's fifth-largest trading partner. Since 1987, trade between mainland China and Taiwan has totalled almost $2 trillion; it grew at a 7 percent annual rate in 1999.⁶ Investment has also undergone similar growth. According to statistics from Taiwan, Taiwanese businesses have invested $14.4 billion spread over 22,000 projects in the mainland. Analysts in Beijing calculated that, at the end of 1999, Taiwan's investors had funded more than 43,500 projects on the mainland worth more than $43.8 billion.⁷ Despite the ongoing hostility, however, China is by far the leading market for Taiwanese investment, claiming more than 40 percent of Taiwan's total foreign investment. The goods produced in these manufacturing enterprises are generally not sold in China or in Taiwan, but are exported to the United States. The failure of China to secure PNTR would have meant serious economic losses to Taiwan. According to recent data, in the first year after Taiwan joins the WTO, the island's "...commodity prices will decline somewhat while overall industrial production will grow considerably, thus paving the way for an increase of US$4 billion in economic value. The island's exports will also grow by 10.3 percent, compared with a growth rate of 12.7 percent in imports..."⁸ Both sides of the Taiwan Strait will further penetrate the world market under the free competition of imported products, the survey concludes. This will also facilitate increased, direct investment in the mainland, thus helping Taiwan transform and upgrade its traditional manufacturing industries.

It is important to note that however critical obtaining PNTR was to Beijing, China's leaders have not been willing to risk their hold on power to get it.⁹ Thus neither claims of sovereignty over Taiwan, nor suppression of dissent from the Falungong, the banned spiritual movement, nor the China Democratic Party were sacrificed to create a more favorable image of China among members of the U.S. Congress.¹⁰ For Beijing, these are highly emotional, fundamental, and non-negotiable challenges to the legitimacy of the Chinese state. Furthermore, Chinese leaders suspect that Americans, particularly those in the Clinton Administration and Congress, are ultimately guided by opportunities for financial gain and would have awarded PNTR to China for economic reasons regardless of Beijing's human rights record or threats against Taiwan.

The U.S. House vote, which passed by a wider margin than had been anticipated, along with the Senate's vote and President Clinton's ratification, confirmed this view. Of course, there was concern voiced during Congressional hearings on the PNTR vote as to China's motives toward Taiwan's WTO entry, as well as China's human rights and environmental policies. The Clinton Administration responded in a letter to Congress. Attempting to expedite the U.S. Senate vote on the PNTR bill, Clinton straightforwardly opposed Beijing's advocacy that Taiwan is a "separate customs territory of China." In the letter, President Clinton wrote: "There should be no question that my administration is firmly committed to Taiwan's accession to the WTO, a point I reiterated in my September 8, 2000, meeting with President Jiang Zemin. Based on our New York discussions with the Chinese, I am confident we have a common understanding that both mainland China and Taiwan will be invited to accede to the WTO at the same WTO General Council session and that Taiwan will join the WTO under the language agreed to in 1992...The United Sates will not accept any other outcome."¹¹ In the end, all legislators in the United States recognize that China's economy directly effects the economy of Taiwan, the centerpoint of much of the concern in Congress due to the long, diplomatic relationship that the U.S. Congress has maintained with the democratic island.

The PRC has strong feelings about Taiwan's participation in international organizations like the WTO, even though the organization does not require statehood. Over the years, Beijing has driven Taiwan out of virtually all such multilateral organizations, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations, insisting that the international community respect China's sovereignty and accept that Taiwan is a part of "one China." Taiwan has been able to preserve a foothold in certain economic groups such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which do not require statehood as a criterion for membership. Taiwan was admitted to APEC at the same time as China and Hong Kong in 1991, and Taiwan was a founding member of the ADB in 1966. In 1983, Ronald Reagan threatened the ADB with reduced U.S. contributions to keep it from surrendering to Beijing's demands that Taiwan be expelled.¹² Over objections from Beijing, Taipei remained a member even after China entered the ADB in 1986, although Taiwan was forced to accept a name change from Republic of China (ROC) to "Taipei, China."¹³

Taiwan voiced an interest in entering the WTO early on. In fact, the Republic of China was a founding member of the GATT, the precursor to the WTO, in 1947 but resigned its position in 1950 as the chaos of civil war on the mainland and the subsequent flight to the island of Taiwan made adhering to all the provisions of the agreement impossible. Between 1965 and 1971, Taiwan took part in the GATT as an observer, a position with less onerous responsibilities than full membership. When the Republic of China left the United Nations in 1971, however, it also lost its GATT observer status. For the United States, this development was not entirely unwelcome since the United States enjoyed trade preferences with Taiwan that it would have had to surrender had Taiwan been part of the GATT system.¹⁴  

In the mid-1980s, Taiwan entered a new era of political, economic, and social transformation. It began a liberalization of its political system that eventually led to multiparty politics and democracy, opposed to the strict military rule since it was founded. The government increased contact with the People's Republic of China, permitting Taiwan's citizens to travel to the mainland and gradually permitting indirect trade. A fresh approach to global affairs called "flexible diplomacy" allowed Taiwan to abandon its claim of being the legitimate government of all of China and conduct its relations on a more realistic basis. Furthermore, it accepted parallel representation in international organizations and even agreed to dual recognition formulas, which Beijing continued to reject. As part of this new policy, in 1987 Taipei launched an internal study to review its relationship to the GATT, and in 1990, Taiwan requested membership under Article 33 of the GATT Charter as the "customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matsu," hoping to evade the sovereignty issue that would clearly anger the government in Beijing. Since Hong Kong had been admitted to the GATT as a customs territory in April 1986, Taiwan anticipated entering on similar terms, taking full advantage of the global trade benefits and adhering to all the same requirements. Eventually, several members of the GATT recognized the advantages of having Taiwan as a member of the organization, since membership would compel Taipei to lower trade barriers.¹⁵

Taiwan's path to reentry, however, was not as smooth as it was hoped it would be. China had applied for membership in 1986, and although its own negotiations of terms progressed much more slowly than did those of Taiwan, the GATT proved unwilling to defy Beijing and admit Taiwan first. Not until July 1991, when President George Bush changed U.S. policy, did a major GATT member support Taipei's application. President Bush did so to secure the backing of Senator Max Baucus (D-MT) for extension of China's most-favored-nation trade treatment in a contentious vote that year. Senator Baucus has long been an ally of the Taipei government and even just recently, visited the island to show his support. In a meeting with President Chen, Senator Baucus stated that he hoped the incoming U.S. administration will continue supporting the ROC and the current cross-Strait status quo. He also suggested that Taiwan strengthen trade and economic exchanges with the mainland to facilitate resumption of cross-Strait dialogue.¹⁶ Although Taipei appreciated the new U.S. policy under President Bush, and will most likely continue to foster beneficial relations under President George W. Bush's Administration, Taiwan continues to insist that it deserves consideration on its own merits and ought not to be dependent upon a successful Chinese application. But as mentioned before, in 1992, when the GATT restored Taipei's observer status and created a Taiwan working group to negotiate entry, the membership also informally agreed to respect Beijing's wishes and postpone the admission of Taiwan until after China joined, an informal policy which has remained intact.

Accession to the GATT/WTO has been far less contentious in Taiwan than in China, where opponents of close relations with the United States have been allied with economic conservatives who perceive adherence to the WTO as a threat to national security. China's premier, Zhu Rongji, actually faced charges of being a national traitor for his April 1999 market-opening concessions to the United States.¹⁷ On November 15, 1999, the United States and China finally concluded 13 years of negotiation and signed a WTO accession agreement. Joseph Fewsmith, a notable political scientist, believes that this agreement is "the Rubicon in China's opening to the outside world," as all previous efforts to integrate China's economy with the world trading community had stopped short of "total commitment."¹⁸

In Taiwan, no similar nationalistic movement arose to block a policy moving toward globalization. Indeed, the popularity of striving to join the world community was reflected in the 1996 National Development Conference in Taipei, which reconfirmed Taiwan's desire to enter the WTO in addition to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.¹⁹ Taiwan has remained steadfast in its bid for WTO entry, even though it will bear significant economic costs at first as a result of entering the WTO. Taipei's Chung-hua Institute for Economic Research, writing for the Cabinet-level Council for Economic Planning and Development, has calculated that with its accession to the WTO exports will fall and imports will rise, producing a $5 billion decrease in Taiwan's trade surplus.²⁰ But Taiwan's officials and economists argue that market liberalization, although it may produce in initial loss, will eventually lead to a more robust economy. To facilitate its entry as early as possible, Taiwan actually volunteered to abide by all the entry requirements of a developed economy, rather than a developing economy, and to subscribe to a range of optional rules in areas such as government procurement and high-tech import tariffs.²¹ This level of concession demonstrates Taiwan's enthusiasm for joining the WTO, although it comes at the dismay of the PRC.

Although Beijing has an informal obligation to support Taiwan's accession since it claims that Taiwan is a province of China, it is not formally required to do so. Although parallel membership in the WTO of both sides of the Taiwan Strait would have clear economic benefits for China, Beijing's leaders assume that Taipei's desire to join the WTO is not simply motivated by economic desires, but also by the desire for political recognition within the global trading community. Beijing has consistently sought to ensure, although not always successfully, that other states treat Taiwan's status as a matter of China's internal politics and not as an international issue. Among Beijing's most bitter complaints about former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui was his effort to internationalize the sovereignty question. Furthermore, China has warned that a foreign presence on the island would be sufficient justification for Beijing to use force, a threat reiterated in its March 2000 Taiwan "White Paper."²² Thus, Beijing's willingness to have Taiwan join the WTO is complicated by the likely political advantage this would give Taipei. Of course, the WTO is traditionally a non-political organization, and will most likely attempt to remain so in the future.  Assumingly, Taiwan hopes, however, that increased economic interdependence will soften Beijing's stance.

Both China and Taiwan finally appear to be on the threshold of accession to the WTO. There is optimism that remaining disputes and obstacles will be resolved in the not too distant future, hopefully in the first two months of 2001. Taipei has signed the necessary agreements with its trade partners, has gone through verification procedures that eliminate inconsistencies between separate accords, and is ready to enter the WTO.²³ In reality, Taiwan's application could be considered now, since under WTO rules, decisions are made by a two-thirds vote. However, traditionally the organization functions by consensus, so approval of Taiwan's request for membership will not be forthcoming until China is also ready.

When China is ready, however, accession might be difficult. Problems impeding Taiwan's entry could arise from actions taken by either Taipei or Beijing. The least likely obstacle would be an effort by Taipei to invoke a non-application formula against China, under Article 13 of the WTO Agreement. Such an action would mean that some or all of Taiwan's concessions could not be claimed by Beijing. Although current members, including the United States, have availed themselves of this option in the past, Taiwan is not expected to do so lest its admission be hampered.

Taiwan gained a new fear, however, that China's willingness to see Taiwan inside the WTO, expressed repeatedly in the past, may have been significantly diminished by the victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the 2000 presidential elections. Beijing's attitude toward a related economic initiative, specifically the establishment of the "three direct links" (in transportation, trade, and mail), did change radically in the aftermath of Chen Shui-bian's election. Beijing declared just days after the DPP's success that these links can only be created if the new president, who has a history of pro-independence activism and whose party was founded on that principle, subscribes to a policy of one China. If Beijing adopted a similar strategy with regard to the WTO, it could, from Taipei's point of view, make Taiwan's accession so difficult that Taiwan would deem it necessary to abandon the accession effort and decline membership.²⁴ This is not very likely, however.

Taiwan also worries that the United States might not prove to be a reliable proponent of its case. To Americans the word games that China and Taiwan play when referring to sovereignty are difficult to understand and the sensitive nuances not always clear. Washington could misread the sparring between Beijing and Taipei or decide that Taipei's reservations are not vital and, citing its one-China policy, side with Beijing. Taiwan's distrust of the United States has long historical and bipartisan roots, dating from the civil war period of the 1940's, through the Nixon betrayal of the 1970's, to the recent actions of the Clinton Administration.

Only in the last two years has President Clinton decided to verbalize the "3 No's," initially during his visit to Shanghai, which was reinforced by the subsequent suggestion by Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth that Taiwan and China reach interim agreements. In Shanghai, President Clinton stated:

I do believe that my coming here and the work we've done in the last two years, President Jiang's trip to the United States, has helped to resolve some of the misunderstandings. I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy. Our only policy has been that we think it has to be done peacefully.²⁵

From Taipei's perspective, Clinton's "3 No's" statement foreclosed self-determination by the people of Taiwan and undercut Taiwan's status in negotiations with the mainland.²⁶ The concept of interim agreements worsened the situation by pressuring Taiwan into talks with Beijing that the United States thought should end in substantive, political results. Not only had Clinton violated President Reagan's six assurances,²⁷ but he did so while cross-strait relations remained tense after the Taiwan Strait crises of 1995 and 1996, when Lee Teng-hui traveled to the United States, and China responded by launching missiles into the waters around Taiwan as scare tactics surrounding the 1996 Presidential election.

On July 9, 1999, President Lee took a strong stance by telling a German reporter that henceforth Taiwan and China should conduct their relations on a special state-to-state basis. President Lee sought to capitalize on strained Sino-American relations in the wake of the "accidental," U.S.-led NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade. He also wanted to break out of the tightening international isolation imposed by Chinese diplomacy. Furthermore, this statement was an attempt to strengthen the presidential candidacy of his vice-president Lien Chan, commit his successor to his policies, and rebuke the United States for trying to coerce Taipei and tilting more toward Beijing than toward Taipei. Of course, due to international pressure, President Lee soon toned down his rhetoric, as it was not in the best interests of either side of the Taiwan Strait. 

Because of its apprehension, the Taipei government has actively offered inducements and sought guarantees from the United States regarding its WTO accession. For example, it increased its quota on imports of American meat and poultry products in early 1999. Analysts believe that WTO membership for Taiwan would mean an expansion of U.S. exports to Taiwan totalling several billion dollars annually.²⁸ In the U.S. Congress, Taipei encouraged efforts to connect PNTR for China to WTO accession for Taipei. This may be why a traditionally pro-Taiwan Congress passed PNTR for China so overwhelmingly.

When both China and Taiwan are able to join the WTO, there will inevitably be significant changes in the relationship between them. Both sides would be compelled to drop trade barriers and open themselves to greater diplomatic interaction and economic interdependence. This should mean a broader scope for confidence building, the most important component of any long-lasting, peaceful solution to conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Under existing conditions, not even a reasonable proposal for resolving differences between Beijing and Taipei would have a chance given the depth of distrust between the two sides. Working together under the auspices of the WTO, however, could enhance understanding. Of course, even if no final solution to the impasse between China and Taiwan results in the near future, expanded trade will most likely reduce distrust and the potential for armed conflict.

WTO accession will make necessary a departure from existing policies designed to protect Taiwan's economy against dependence upon the mainland and will increase the mainland's dependence on Taiwan's direct investment. In reaction to increased cross-strait economic relations, former President Lee sought to restrain eager investors. Without limitations, it became apparent that businessmen are willing to increase investments in mainland China's industrial areas, hollowing out Taiwan's industrial core and transferring advanced technology to make their mainland production internationally competitive.²⁹ Lured by a common language, similar cultural background, cheap labor, natural resources, and a huge domestic market, Taiwan's businesses would not exercise any self-control to maintain the national interest. In Lee's eyes, eventually Taiwan's businessmen would act as a pro-China lobby in Taiwan, help build a richer and more threatening China, or simply render the island's economy vulnerable to PRC boycotts and sanctions. The point was clearly illustrated from 1995 through 2000, when, at times of crisis, Beijing harassed Taiwan's investors on the mainland, seeking to shape their politics and the influence they could exert at home.³⁰ During the 1980's, to avoid giving Beijing leverage, Taiwan's investment on the mainland was illegal, but widespread evasion of existing laws convinced Taipei officials to lift the prohibition in 1991. The resulting rush to put money into China led to a new effort in 1993 to encourage investment in Southeast Asia, including provision of funds to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to build export-processing zones and industrial parks to accommodate Taiwan's businesses.³¹ By the end of 1994, Taiwan had become the second largest investor in Southeast Asia after Japan. But the flow of money southward did not stop the flood into China. The government reinforced its rhetoric with regulations, banning investment in PRC infrastructure, high-technology industries, and the energy and service sectors, requiring investments over $5 million to be licensed and capping individual projects at $50 million.³² These restrictions inevitably failed, and Taiwan investment in China increased over the last few years. The current leader of Taiwan, President Chen, has seen the importance of economic interdependence as the beginning of a solution to cross-strait relations.

WTO rules of course threaten to further develop interdependence between China and Taiwan, which also strikes at the Taiwan's national defense. A system that emphasizes elimination of trade barriers and the granting of most-favored-nation treatment strikes at the heart of rules meant not only to control Taiwan investment in and exports to China, but also Chinese investment in and exports to Taiwan. For instance, WTO regulations would throw open Taiwan's markets to mainland agricultural products and compel Taipei to permit direct shipping, air traffic, and postal communications (the three links) to facilitate commercial exchange.³³ Furthermore, President Chen and the DPP have long been committed to such openings to China, but realizes that risk is inherently involved.³⁴ Taipei could find itself under assault by aggressive Chinese economic policies. If so, it could invoke Article 21 of the WTO Agreement, which would allow it to restrict specific trade rights for China that jeopardize national security.³⁵ A less confrontational approach would follow the Japan's example, imposing informal trade and investment barriers, such as phytosanitary (plant health) regulations.³⁶ China could lodge complaints against such policies, just as Washington has done against Japan in various venues, however, it would take years to break down each of these constraints. In addition, because so much of the commercial interaction in the Asia marketplace is multinational, Taipei might be able to call upon foreign investors to assist in overcoming threatening Chinese schemes. Hopefully, through increased multinational interdependence, Taiwan will be able to invoke its trading partners into pressuring China not to infringe on Taiwan's security. This, of course, is the overall hope and underlying reason why both nations' WTO accession has been supported so overwhelmingly by the major economic powers, especially the United States.

It is clear that both sides of the Taiwan Strait have much to gain, and much to risk, in their now inevitable entry into the World Trade Organization. WTO provisions will require liberalization of trade and economic ties over the Taiwan Strait, and most current restrictions on Taiwan-China trade and investment are incompatible with WTO requirements. Thus, WTO membership will hopefully reinforce the move for liberalization already occurring in Taiwan and encourage President Chen to lift any remaining restrictions. The inevitable result would be more trade and investment between Beijing and Taipei, which can only benefit the citizens and national interests of both parties. Expanded economic ties are not an ultimate solution for tensions between Taiwan and China. The relationship

1. John R. Bolton, "Taiwan Deserves Accession to WTO Foreign Affairs: Whether Beijing is ready now, too, is not the issue here," The Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1999.

2. Jim Mann, "Taiwan's New President Backs Sino-American Trade," The Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2000.

3. Inauguration Speech, March 20, 2000, from the Taiwan government website, http://th.gio.gov.tw/pi2000/dow_1.htm.

4. Mann, March 22, 2000.

5. "Taiwan's WTO Bid Hinges on the United States," The China Post, October 3, 2000, Taiwan Headlines Website, http://www.taiwanheadlines.org.tw.

6. Greg Mastel, "WTO Means More Trade for China, Taiwan," Journal of Commerce, April 28, 2000, Journal of Commerce Online, http://www.joc.com.

7. "Taiwanese Contracted China Investment Up 46%," April 13, 2000, China Online, http://www.chinaonline.com.

8. "WTO Membership worth U.S.$4 Billion to Taiwan," The Taiwan Economic News, November 9, 2000, Taiwan Headlines Website, http://www.taiwanheadlines.org.tw.

9. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "The Taiwan Factor in the Vote on PNTR For China and Its WTO Accession," The National Bureau of Asian Research, July 2000, NBR Website, http://www.nbr.org/publications/analysis/vol11no2/index.html.

10. Ibid.

11. "Taiwan's WTO bid hinges on U.S.," The China Post, October 3, 2000, Taiwan Headlines Website, http://www.taiwanheadlines.org.tw.

12. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. "Taiwan President Meets U.S. Senator, Hopes for Cross-Strait Entry to WTO," December 12, 2000, Taiwanese Central News Agency, Asia Gateway Website

17. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

18. Joseph Fewsmith, "China and the WTO: The Politics Behind the Agreement," The National Bureau of Asian Research, December 1999, NBR Website, http://www.nbr.org.

19. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

20. Simon Burns, "WTO Entry to Cost Taiwan $5 billion," Financial Times, November 30, 1999, p. 16.

21. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

22. Taiwan White Paper, The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml.

23. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

24. Ibid.

25. "Remarks by the President and the First Lady In Discussion on Shaping China For the 21st Century," Shanghai Library, Shanghai, People's Republic of China, June 30, 1998 (www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/China).

26. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

27. Reagan's six assurances were given to Taiwan when its president grudgingly accepted the August 17, 1982, Communiqué with China regarding arms sales to Taiwan. These assurances said that the United States 1) had not set a date for ending arms sales; 2) would not consult China regarding arms sales; 3) would not mediate between Beijing and Taipei; 4) would not revise the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979; 5) had not altered its position regarding Taiwan's sovereignty; and 6) would not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with China.

28. Greg Mastel, "Stop Tiptoeing Around and Celebrate Taiwan," Journal of Commerce, March 17, 2000, Journal of Commerce Online, http://www.joc.com.

29. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

30. Ibid.

31. Chu Yun-han, "The Prospect of Cross-strait Economic Relations Under the New President," paper delivered at the CSIS Conference on "Taiwan 2000 Presidential Election: Issues and Interpretation," March 29-30, 2000, Washington, D.C., found at Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

32. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

33. John Pomfret, "Taiwan Enticed by 'Huge Market' in China," Washington Post, March 27, 2000, A19, Dow Jones Interactive, http://www.djinteractive.com.

34. "DPP White Paper on China Policy for the 21st Century," November 1999, DPP Website, http://www.dpp.org.tw.

35. Bernkopf Tucker, July 2000.

36. Ibid.